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In this paper we argue that risk-adjustment matters for the valuation of financial distress costs, since
financial distress is more likely to happen in bad times. Systematic distress risk implies that the risk-
adjusted probability of financial distress is larger than the historical probability. Alternatively, the
correct valuation of distress costs should use a discount rate that is lower than the risk free rate. We
derive a formula for the valuation of distress costs, and propose two strategies to implement it. The
first strategy uses corporate bond spreads to derive risk-adjusted probabilities of financial distress.
The  second  strategy  estimates  the  risk  adjustment  directly  from  historical  data  on  distress
probabilities, using several established asset pricing models. In both cases, we find that exposure to
systematic risk increases the NPV of financial distress costs. In addition, the magnitude of the risk-
adjustment can be very large, suggesting that a valuation of distress costs that ignores systematic risk
significantly underestimates their true present value. Finally, we show that marginal distress costs
computed using our new formula can be large enough to balance the marginal tax benefits of debt
derived by Graham (2000), and we conclude that systematic distress risk can help explain why firms
appear rather conservative in their use of debt.
Heitor Almeida
NYU Stern School of Business
Department of Finance
44 West 4th Street, Room 9-85




NYU Stern School of Business
Department of Finance
44 West 4th Street, Suite 9-190
New York, NY 10012-1126
tphilipp@stern.nyu.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
T h e r ei sal a r g el i t e r a t u r et h a ta r g u e st h a tﬁnancial distress can have both direct and
indirect costs (Warner, 1977, Altman, 1984, Weiss, 1990, Ofek, 1993, Asquith, Gertner and
Scharfstein, 1994, Opler and Titman, 1994, Sharpe, 1994, Gilson, 1997, and Andrade and
Kaplan, 1998). However, there is much debate as to whether such costs are high enough to
matter much for corporate valuation practices and capital structure decisions. Direct costs
of distress, such as those entailed by litigation fees, are relatively small.1 Indirect costs,
such as loss of market share (Opler and Titman, 1994) and ineﬃcient asset sales (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1992), are believed to be more important, but they are also much harder to
quantify. Andrade and Kaplan (1998), for example, estimate losses of the order of 10% to
23% of ﬁrm value at the time of distress for a sample of highly leveraged ﬁrms. However,
they also argue that part of these costs might actually not be genuine ﬁnancial distress
costs, but rather consequences of the economic shocks that drove the ﬁrms into distress.
They suggest that, from an ex-ante perspective, distress costs are probably small, specially
in comparison to the potential tax beneﬁts of debt.2 In contrast, Opler and Titman (1994)
argue that distress costs can be large for certain types of ﬁrms, such as those that engage
in substantial R&D activities.3
While the previous literature has analyzed in detail the nature of distress costs, and has
attempted to estimate the loss in value upon distress, it has devoted much less attention to
the proper capitalization of ﬁnancial distress costs. For example, Molina (2005) calculates
the ex-ante cost of distress as the historical probability of default multiplied by Andrade
and Kaplan’s (1998) estimates of the loss in ﬁrm value given default. This calculation
ignores the capitalization and discounting of distress costs. Other papers do incorporate
1Warner (1977) and Weiss (1990), for example, estimate costs of the order of 3%-5% of ﬁrm value at the
time of distress.
2Altman (1984) ﬁnds similar cost estimates of 11% to 17% of ﬁrm value on average, three years prior to
bankruptcy. However, it is not clear that all such costs can be attributed to genuine ﬁnancial distress (Opler
and Titman, 1994, and Andrade and Kaplan, 1998).
3Not all the literature agrees with the proposition that distress only has costs. Wruck (1990) argues that
the organizational restructuring that accompanies distress might have beneﬁts, and Ofek (1993) suggests
that leverage might force ﬁrms to respond more quickly to poor performance. In addition, Eberhardt,
Altman and Aggarwal (1997) ﬁnd that ﬁrms appear to do unexpectedly well post-bankruptcy.
1some form of discounting. The usual approach in the literature is to assume risk-neutrality,
and discount the product of historical probabilities and losses in value given default by a
risk-free rate (e.g., Altman (1984)).4
In this paper we develop a methodology to value ﬁnancial distress costs. Like the
existing literature, we take as given the estimates of losses in value given distress provided
by Andrade and Kaplan (1998) and Altman (1984). We suggest a simple way to capitalize
these losses into a NPV formula for (ex-ante) distress costs, which takes into account time
variation in marginal probabilities of ﬁnancial distress, and the shape of the term structure
of interest rates.5 Most importantly, we argue that the common practice of using both
historical probabilities of distress and risk free rates to value distress costs is wrong.
The problem with the traditional approach is that the incidence of ﬁnancial distress is
correlated with macroeconomic shocks such as major recessions,6 generating a systematic
component to distress risk. In fact, the asset pricing literature on credit yield spreads
has provided substantial evidence for a systematic component in corporate default risk.
It is well-known that the spread between corporate and government bonds is too high
to be explained only by expected default.7 The literature also presents direct evidence
for a default risk premium implicit in corporate bond spreads (Elton, Gruber, Agrawal
and Mann, 2001, Huang and Huang, 2003, Longstaﬀ, Mittal, and Neis, 2004, Driessen,
2005, Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein, 2005).8 This systematic component of default
risk raises the possibility that investors might care more about default (and thus ﬁnancial
distress) than what is implied by risk-free discounting. In particular, this insight suggests
that in order to value distress costs correctly, either the discount rate or the probability of
distress must be adjusted for risk. If historical probabilities are used to compute expected
4Recent models of dynamic capital structure that incorporate distress costs also assume risk-neutrality,
and thus implicitly discount the costs of ﬁnancial distress by the risk free rate (e.g., Titman and Tsyplakov
(2004), and Hennessy and Whited (2005)).
5There is evidence that marginal default probabilities increase over time for ﬁrms rated investment-grade,
but show the opposite pattern for ﬁrms whose debt is rated junk (Duﬃe and Singleton, 2003).
6See Denis and Denis (1995) for some evidence that the incidence of distress is related to macroeconomic
conditions.
7Jones, Mason and Rosenfeld (1984) provide some early evidence on this.
8See also Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), who examine the determinants of movements in
credit spreads.
2distress costs, then these costs must be discounted by a rate that is lower than the risk
free rate. Alternatively, if the risk free rate is used in the valuation, then the probability of
distress must be higher than the historical one in order to account for distress risk.9 Either
way, this insight suggests that the existing corporate ﬁnance research has underestimated
the total cost of ﬁnancial distress.
W ep r o p o s et w om e t h o d st od e r i v et h er i s ka d j u s t m e n t .F i r s t ,w ee x p l o i tt h ef a c tt h a t
distress costs tend to happen when the ﬁrm is in default, and derive a formula for risk-
adjusted (risk neutral) probabilities of distress as functions of bond yield spreads, recovery
r a t e sa n dr i s kf r e er a t e s . 10 Our approach incorporates recent insights of the literature on
credit yield spreads, which suggests that one should not attribute the entire yield spread
to default risk, because of tax and liquidity eﬀects (Elton et al., 2001, Chen, Lesmond,
and Wei, 2004). Our estimates use only the fraction of bond yield spreads that is likely to
be due to default. Because there is some disagreement in the literature as to what is the
exact fraction of the spread that can be attributed to default, we use several approaches
to transform yield spreads into risk neutral default probabilities (Huang and Huang, 2003,
Longstaﬀ et al., 2004, Driessen, 2005, and Chen et al, 2005). Our estimates imply that the
risk neutral probability of default and, consequently, the risk-adjusted NPV of distress costs,
are considerably larger than, respectively, the true probability and the non risk-adjusted
NPV of distress. However, the exact size of these diﬀerences depend on the fraction of the
yield spread that is due to default.
To give an example of our ﬁndings using this ﬁrst approach, consider a ﬁrm whose bonds
are rated BBB. The historical 4-year cumulative probability of default for BBB bonds is
1.44%, and the average spread between 4-year BBB bonds and 4-year treasury yields is
1.7%. Longstaﬀ et al. (2004), and Chen et al. (2005) suggest that up to 70% of the spread
could be due to default risk. In contrast, Huang and Huang (2003) attribute only 25% of the
spread to default risk.11 If we use Huang and Huang’s numbers to adjust for risk, we end up
9In other words, the risk-neutral probability of ﬁnancial distress should be larger than the historical one.
10This derivation is based on Lando (2004).
11The estimates in Driessen (2005) lie between these two extremes.
3with risk neutral probabilities that are twice as large as the historical ones.12 However, the
Longstaﬀ et al. and Chen et al. numbers suggest a risk neutral 4-year cumulative default
probability of 7.5%, approximately ﬁve times the historical probability. Using an estimate
of 15% for the loss in ﬁrm value given distress,13 these numbers translate into NPVs of
distress of 2.5% of ﬁrm value for the Huang and Huang numbers, and 6% of ﬁrm value for
the Longstaﬀ et al. and Chen et al. numbers. While even the Huang and Huang numbers
generate an NPV that is substantially larger than the non-risk adjusted NPV of 1.34%,i t
is clear that ﬁnancial distress is more costly to the extent that yield spreads reﬂect actual
default risk, rather than liquidity or taxes.
Our second approach to derive the risk-adjustment is to price distress risk directly from
standard asset pricing models, such as the consumption CAPM and the Fama-French factor
model. In this set up, the magnitude of the bias implied by the lack of risk adjustment
is proportional to the covariance between expected distress costs (that is, the product of
the probability of distress times the loss in value given distress), and the economy’s asset
pricing kernel. Because we lack time series data on losses given default, we calculate the
risk-adjustment by correlating the asset pricing kernels with the probability of distress only.
We create a time series for the probability of distress using either annual default rates in
the high yield bond market from Altman, Brady, Resti, and Sironi (2003), or an accounting
measure of distress that is based on Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein (1994) and Andrade
and Kaplan (1998).
The results provide direct evidence for a systematic component in distress risk. The
correlation between the probability of distress and the various asset pricing kernels is uni-
formly positive, suggesting that it is indeed the case that distress is more likely in bad times.
These results are qualitatively consistent with those of the former approach. However, the
magnitude of the risk adjustment suggested by the asset pricing models is substantially
smaller than that the one suggested by the yield spread method. The highest risk ad-
12The 4-year cumulative probability of default is the total probability that the ﬁrm has defaulted between
years 1 and 4. In other words, the historical probability that a BBB-rated ﬁrm survives 4 years is 98.56%.
13This estimate is inside the range of 10%-23% estimated by Andrade and Kaplan (1998). We also provide
comparative statics’ results on this key parameter in section 5.2.3.
4justment suggested by the asset pricing models is in the order of 20%. Thus, referring
back to our previous example, this alternative approach would suggest a risk neutral 4-year
cumulative probability of default for BBB bonds that is at most 20% higher than the his-
torical probability of 1.44%. We believe this diﬀerence in the results is not surprising given
the limitations of this approach, when compared to the ﬁr s to n e . I ti sw e l lk n o w nt h a t
standard pricing kernels such as the one based on consumption growth have a hard time
explaining the entire risk premium that is observed in asset prices. In contrast, the bond
yield approach does not require the direct speciﬁcation of a pricing kernel. Thus, the risk
adjustment suggested by the asset pricing models should be seen as a lower bound to the
true risk adjustment.
We believe that the main contribution of our paper is methodological: we show how one
should compute the NPV of ﬁnancial distress costs, in the presence of systematic distress
risk. In addition, the magnitude of the distress risk adjustment that we ﬁnd under some of
our speciﬁcations implies that ﬁnancial distress costs can have a bigger impact on corporate
policies than previous literature has suggested. For example, Graham (2000) estimates
marginal tax beneﬁts of debt, and conjectures that marginal distress costs are too small
to overcome potential tax beneﬁts of increased leverage, in the context of a static trade-oﬀ
model of capital structure. He concludes that ﬁrms are probably too conservative in their
use of debt. In order to verify whether this conclusion continues to hold after using our
formula for the NPV of distress costs, we compare the marginal tax beneﬁts of debt derived
by Graham (2000) with our estimates for marginal, risk-adjusted distress costs.14
Our results suggest that marginal distress costs can be of the same magnitude of marginal
tax beneﬁts of debt, specially if the fraction of the yield spread that is due to default risk
is large, as suggested by Longstaﬀ et al. (2004), and Chen et al. (2005). In this case, our
results show that, if the loss in value given distress is in the 10%-20% range estimated by
Andrade and Kaplan, the marginal gains in tax beneﬁts of moving away from the highest
14Like we do in this paper, Graham (2000) uses Andrade and Kaplan’s (1998) estimates of losses in value
given distress to calculate the costs of ﬁnancial distress. Thus, the main diﬀerence between our estimates,
and Graham’s estimates for the NPV of distress, is the risk-adjusted NPV formula that we derive.
5ratings such as AAA or AA can be lower than the associated increase in distress costs.
If the fraction of the spread that is due to default is smaller (as suggested by Huang and
Huang (2003)), or under no risk-adjustment, then marginal tax beneﬁts of debt tend to be
higher than marginal distress costs at least until the ﬁrm reaches a rating of A to BBB.
There results suggest that the large distress costs that we estimate can help explain why
many US ﬁrms appear to be conservative in their use of debt.15
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we develop our valuation formula
and we discuss the main intuition. In section 3, we show how the information in yield
spreads can be used to derive the distress risk adjustment. Section 3.2 contains a simple
version of our NPV formula that assumes away the term structure of interest rates and
default probabilities, and that might be useful for teaching purposes. In section 4, we use
asset pricing models to calculate the risk adjustment and to value distress costs. Section 5
discusses the capital structure implications of our results, and section 6 concludes.
2 The General Approach
Let φt be the deadweight losses that the ﬁrm incurs in case of default at time t. We think
of φt as a one time cost paid in case of distress. After distress, the ﬁrm might reorganize,
or it might be liquidated. In case it does not default, the ﬁrm moves to period t +1 ,a n d
so on. Figure 1 illustrates the timing of the model. We let pt be the marginal probability
of default in year t. The assumption of no-arbitrage guarantees the existence of a pricing









where dt is an indicator of default at time t. Throughout the paper, we will maintain the
assumption that φt is idiosyncratic.
Assumption A1: The deadweight loss φt in case of default is uncorrelated with the
15Nevertheless, the full explanation for debt conservatism probably involves more than a static trade-oﬀ
model, given Graham’s (2000) ﬁnding that ﬁrms that are likely to have the lowest costs of ﬁnancial distress
s e e mt ob et h em o s tc o n s e r v a t i v ei nt h e i ru s eo fd e b t .
6pricing kernel, cov (mt,φt)=0 , and its unconditional mean is constant over time, E [φt]=
φ.
There is much debate in the literature on how to estimate the actual cash ﬂow losses that
are exclusively due to ﬁnancial distress. In particular, while the literature does provide some
estimates of the average deadweight costs of distress (i.e., Andrade and Kaplan, 1998), no
paper has attempted to estimate a time series of these deadweight costs that would allow us
to estimate their covariance with the pricing kernel. Because of this diﬃculty, our estimates
w i l lb eb a s e do n l yo nt h es y s t e m a t i cr i s ki nt h eprobability that ﬁnancial distress occurs.
Assumption A1 could lead us to underestimate the risk adjustment if the dead-weight
losses conditional on distress are higher in bad times, as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny
(1992). However, it is also possible that deadweight losses are higher in good times, because
ﬁnancial distress might cause the ﬁrm to lose proﬁtable growth options (Myers, 1977). While
it would be theoretically straightforward to relax assumption A1, there is no data that would
allow us to estimate the covariance between m and φ.








(BtE [dt]+cov [mt,d t]) ,
where Bt = E [mt] is the price at time zero of a riskless zero-coupon bond paying one dollar
at date t.
The ﬁrst term in equation (2) is the fair compensation for default losses, which has been
the focus of the literature so far. Our contribution is to estimate the second term of the
equation. If default is more likely to happen whenmt is high — in bad times — then the
covariance is positive, and the ex-ante costs of ﬁnancial distress are larger than suggested by
the fair compensation alone. We will describe two ways to implement the risk adjustment of
equation (2). The ﬁrst implementation, in section 3, argues that d can be replicated using a
riskless government bond and the ﬁrm’s risky debt. This implementation does not require
7the speciﬁcation of the pricing kernel mt. The second implementation, in section 4, starts
from a standard kernel and directly estimates the covariance term from historical data.
3 Implementation with Corporate Bond Yields
Our ﬁrst strategy to value the costs of ﬁnancial distress starts from the observation that
the costs of distress tend to occur in states in which the ﬁrm’s debt is in default. As we
show below, this argument implies that given an estimate for the loss in ﬁrm value given
distress, the net present value of distress co s t sc a nb eo b t a i n e df r o md a t ao nt h er i s kf r e e
rate, the ﬁrm’s yield spread and the bonds’ recovery rate.
To proceed, we must now introduce some notation to describe default events and default
rates. Let Qt =
Qt
s=1(1−ps) be the cumulative historical survival rate, i.e., the probability
of not defaulting between 0 and t.B y c o n v e n t i o n , Q0 =1 . The probability that default
occurs exactly at date t is equal to Qt−1pt (see Figure 1). We also let Pt =1− Qt denote




Qt−1ptE [mt| dt =1 ] . (3)
The credit risk literature uses risk adjusted probabilities to estimate default risk premia.




Bt ˜ Qt−1˜ pt ,( 4 )




E[mt] ,a n dt h a te Qt−1 is the risk-neutral probability that the corporation does not
default before time t.W e n o w e x p l a i n h o w t o r e c o v e r˜ Qt−1 and ˜ pt from corporate bond
yields.
3.1 Credit Spreads and the Risk Neutral Probability of Financial Distress
Let ρt be the recovery rate on defaulted bonds. We use the strategy proposed by Lando
(2004), who makes the following assumption about recovery rates:
8Assumption A2: The recovery rate on defaulted bonds ρt is uncorrelated with the
pricing kernel. In case of default at time t, the creditors get back a fraction ρt of the
discounted value of a similar, but risk-free, bond. E [ρt] is constant and equal to ρ.
Under assumption A2, the price at date 0 of a zero-coupon corporate bond paying at
date t is
Vt =[ ρ(1 − e Qt)+ e Qt]Bt .( 5 )
Most fundamentally, assumption A2 implies that there is no systematic recovery risk. As
discussed in Lando (2004), an additional assumption required to derive equation (5) is that
t h ep r e s e n tv a l u e( a td a t e0) of recovery of the corporate zero paying at date t does not
depend on whether recovery happens exactly at year t, or before. We discuss assumption
A2 in section 3.2.









t )t , (7)
where rF i st h er i s kf r e er a t ea n drD is the promised yield on the bond. Thus, given an
estimate for ρ, e Qt can be estimated for all maturities for which we have both interest rates
and yield spreads. Finally, we note that the probabilities e pt can be backed from the sequence
e Qt recursively, using
e Qt+1 = e Qt(1 − e pt+1) .( 8 )
The risk neutral probabilities of distress can be inferred from the term structure of interest
rates and yield spreads. Equation (4) will then give an estimate for the NPV of distress
costs, which incorporates the default risk adjustment that is implicit in bond yield spreads.
Below we discuss issues related to the estimation of the key parameters, and provide some
estimates of the NPV of distress costs calculated separately for each bond rating.
93.2 A Simple Example with Flat Term Structures
Before we move on to the empirical section, it is useful to illustrate the procedure for the
simple case in which the term structure of risk free rates and the term structure of default
risk are both ﬂat.16 We will also use this simple case to discuss the potential issues with




e p + rF φ .( 9 )
In this case, it is also easy to derive an explicit formula for the risk neutral probability of











(1 + rD)(1− ρ)
.( 1 1 )
Formulas (9) and (11) are useful to illustrate the intuition of the risk adjustment implied
by the general procedure. First, notice that the true probability of distress does not appear
in the formulas derived above. In particular, φ is the loss in value that the ﬁrm incurs
conditional on the event of distress. The formulas also imply that if we deﬁne rφ as the




rF .( 1 2 )
In other words, if the risk-neutral probability of distress is larger t h a nt h et r u ep r o b a b i l i t y
of distress, then the correct rate to discount distress costs must be lower than the risk-free
rate.17 A similar intuition holds for the general case in which the term structure of interest
rates and yield spreads is not ﬂat.
16We are not assuming that the default rate is constant, in which case there would be no adjustment. We
are only assuming that the term structure of marginal default risk is ﬂat, so ˜ p is constant, and the NPV
formula can be solved by hand.
17Using the expected return on the ﬁrm’s debt to discount the costs of ﬁnancial distress, as is sometimes
advocated, is worse than simply using the risk free rate. In fact, it is easy to show that the correct discount
rate for the costs of ﬁnancial distress is less than the risk free rate if and only if the expected return on debt
is more than the risk free rate.
10Notice also that the extent of the risk adjustment implied by our procedure is a direct
function of the yield spread rD − rF.18 Larger spreads translate directly into large risk
neutral probabilities of distress. However, the procedure assumes that the yield spread is
due entirely to the losses that bondholders expect to incur in the event of default. By
contrast, in the real world, the yield spread is also aﬀected by taxes and liquidity. In the
empirical section below we discuss this issue in detail, and adjust our estimates for tax and
liquidity eﬀects.
Notice also that the higher the recovery rate, the higher the risk adjustment implied by
equation (11). The intuition is that if recovery is high, the fraction of the yield spread that
can be attributed to the probability of default increases. This intuition also suggests that
assumption A2 may lead us to overestimate the risk adjustment implied in yield spreads.
Because there is evidence that recovery rates tend to be lower in bad times (Altman et
al., 2003, and Allen and Saunders, 2004), the yield spread should also reﬂect recovery risk.
Thus, one cannot attribute the entire diﬀerence between e p and p to ﬁnancial distress risk. In
the empirical analysis, we verify the robustness of our results to the introduction of recovery
risk.19
3.3 Empirical Estimates
We start by describing the data that we use to implement the formulas above. We then
proceed to discuss the calculation of risk-neutral probabilities of default. Finally, we present
our estimates of the NPV of distress costs using yield spreads to derive the distress risk
adjustment.
3.3.1 Data on Yield Spreads, Recovery Rates and Default Rates
We obtain data on corporate bond yields from Citigroup’s yield book, which reports average
yields over the period 1985-2004. The data is available separately for bonds rated A and
18To be more precise, the spread is
1+rD
1+rF − 1,w h i c hi sc l o s et or
D − r
F if both r
D and r
F are small.
19We note, however, that the evidence for systematic recovery risk is not uncontroversial. For example,
Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2004) relate recovery rates to Fama-French factors, GDP growth and the
SP 500 return, and do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant relationships, even without controlling for industry variables. See
Allen and Saunders (2004) for a broader review of the literature.
11BBB, and for maturities 1-3, 3-7, 7-10, and 10+ years. For bonds rated BB and below the
data is available only as an average for all maturities. The yieldbook also reports data for
AAA and AA bonds as a single category. Instead of using this single category, we chose
to use Huang and Huang’s (2003) yield spread data for these two ratings, from Lehman’s
bond index (Table I in Huang and Huang). Huang and Huang’s data cover a diﬀerent period
(1973-1993), but their spread estimates are very close to those reported in Citigroup’s yield
book, for ratings and maturities that are available in both data sets. For example, the
average spread for BB-rated bonds is 3.20% in Huang and Huang’s data, and 3.08% in the
yield book data. Huang and Huang report data for 4- and 10-year maturities for AAA and
AA bonds.
Data on average treasury yields is also obtained from the yield book, for the same time
period (1985-2004) and maturities as above. The average treasury yields are, respectively,
5.71%, 6.31%, 6.70%, and 7.08% for maturities 1-3, 3-7, 7-10 and 10+ years. These numbers
are virtually identical to those obtained from the FRED website for the same time period.
We interpolate linearly the data on treasury and investment-grade corporate bond yields
to ﬁll out all maturities between 1 and 10 years. For bonds rated BB and below (high
yield), we assigned the average reported yield to maturity 8, and then ﬁll out the remaining
maturities by assuming a constant yield spread across maturities.20 Table 1 reports the
yield spread data that we use, for a few select maturities and for the diﬀerent bond ratings.
Table 1 also shows some of our data for average cumulative default probabilities, which
we obtain from Moodys, for the period 1970-2001. The cumulative default rates are available
from one year following the issuance of the bonds, up to 17 years following issuance.21 The
default probabilities are very close to those in Huang and Huang’s Table 1. Moodys also
reports a time series of bond recovery rates for the period 1982-2001. In most of our
calculations we assume a constant recovery rate, which we set to the average value in the
Moodys’ data (0.413). This value is lower than the one used by Huang and Huang (0.513).
As discussed above, our use of a lower recovery rate will reduce our estimate of the distress
20Citigroup reports an average maturity close to 8 years for high yield bonds in their sample.
21The credit rating of the bonds refers to that of the time of issuance.
12risk adjustment. Below (see section 4.4) we also use the whole time series of recovery rates
to address the impact of recovery risk in our calculations.
3.3.2 Estimating the Fraction of the Yield Spread that is due to Default Risk
There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the role of default risk in explaining the
yield spread, vis-a-vis other potential explanations such as lower liquidity, and the state
tax disadvantage of corporate bonds. Because treasuries are more liquid than corporate
bonds part of the spread should reﬂect a liquidity premium (see Chen et al., 2004). Also,
treasuries have a tax-advantage over corporate bonds because they are not subject to state
and local taxes (Elton et al., 2001). While the literature agrees that not all the yield spread
is due to default, there is controversy as to the speciﬁc fraction that one should attribute
to default losses.
A number of papers have attempted to estimate the fraction of the yield spread that
should be attributed to the risk of default. Huang and Huang (2003) use a structural
credit risk valuation model calibrated to historical default rates, and argue that credit risk
accounts for only a small fraction of the spread, specially for investment-grade bonds. In
contrast, Longstaﬀ et al. (2004) and Chen et al. (2005) argue that credit risk has much
more explanatory power than Huang and Huang’s results suggest. In Table 2, we summarize
the ﬁndings of these three recent papers.22 Huang and Huang provide estimates for 4- and
10-year maturities, while Longstaﬀ et al. and Chen et al. consider only one maturity (5-
years, and 4-years, respectively).23 In addition, Chen et al. consider only BBB bonds in
their analysis. They show that the entire spread between BBB and AAA bonds can be
explained by credit risk, while assuming that the spread between AAA and treasury bonds
22Actually, Huang and Huang (2003) and Longstaﬀ et al. (2004) report not only the fractions reported in
Table 2, but also other fractions calculated under diﬀerent assumptions. Because Huang and Huang provide
the lowest fraction estimates, we chose the highest fractions suggested by their paper (from Table 7). The
ratio of the default component to the total spread for Longstaﬀ et al. (2004) comes from their Table IV,
which, according to the authors, reports results for their preferred speciﬁcation.
23Longstaﬀ et al. (2004) use data from the credit default swap market to estimate the fraction of credit
spreads that is due to default. In particular, they argue that the swap premium is free of tax and liquidity
eﬀects, and thus can be used as a direct measure of spreads that are due to default losses. The default swaps
in their data have a typical maturity of 5 years.
13is entirely due to tax and liquidity considerations. As one can see from Table 2, the results
in Longstaﬀ et al. and Chen et al. suggest a larger role for credit risk in explaining the yield
spread. Because of this disagreement, our empirical analysis will use all of these alternative
approaches.
Given the fractions in Table 2, we can apply formula (5) above to estimate the cumulative
risk-neutral probabilities of default at diﬀerent horizons. Instead of using the entire observed
yield spread rD − rF in these calculations, we use only the fraction that is likely to be due
to default according to the estimates in Table 2. The numbers are in Table 3, which reports
both the cumulative risk neutral probabilities of default (e Pt =1− e Qt, in the notation
above), and the ratio between risk-neutral and historical probabilities (those reported in
T a b l e1 ) .A c c o r d i n gt ot h eH u a n ga n dH u a n ge s t i m a t e s ,t h i sr a t i oﬂuctuates between 2 and
3.5 for the investment-grade bonds (BBB and higher), and goes down to approximately 1.2
to 1.4 for the high yield bonds. The Huang and Huang estimates also suggest that the ratio
between risk-neutral and historical probabilities does not appear to vary that much with
maturity, for a given bond rating. The cumulative risk-neutral probabilities of default are
much higher when we use Longstaﬀ et al. and Chen et al. estimates, as the other columns
of Table 3 show. For example, the 4-year risk neutral cumulative probability of default for
BBB bonds is 7.58% according to Chen et al.’s estimates, but it is only 2.80% according to
Huang and Huang’s numbers.24
Our valuation equation (4) requires the entire term structure of risk neutral probabilities.
Given the evidence in Table 3, a reasonable way to extrapolate the results of Table 3 into
other maturities is to assume (for each rating) a constant ratio between risk neutral and
historical probabilities for all maturities, and use the historical probabilities (which are
available for all maturities) to estimate the term structure of default probabilities. More
formally, our assumption is
24We also obtained the data on risk neutral probabilities and ratios between risk neutral and historical
probabilities from Driessen (2005), who analyzes bon d sr a t e dA A ,Aa n dB B B .H i sr a t i oe s t i m a t e sa r ec l o s e
to Huang and Huang (2003) for AA and A bonds, and are slightly higher than those in Huang and Huang
for BBB bonds. Because his estimates are generally between those in Huang and Huang and Longstaﬀ et
al. / Chen et al., we focus on these two extreme cases hereinafter.
14Assumption A3: The ratio between risk neutral and historical cumulative default prob-
abilities is the same for diﬀerent maturities t within each rating j
e Pj,t = kjPj,t ,( 1 3 )
In the valuation exercise below, we use the ratios kj depicted in Table 3. In particular,
when using the Huang and Huang’s estimates, we average kj across the 4- and the 10-year
maturities. Because the data suggests that k does vary with the bond rating, we chose not
to extrapolate across ratings. For example, if we use the Chen et al.’s estimates in Table 3,
we can only provide a valuation of distress costs for the AAA and the BBB bond ratings.
3.3.3 Valuation of Distress Costs
Despite our assumption of a constant risk-adjustment across maturities, we cannot assume
a constant risk-neutral marginal probability of default, because the historical marginal
probabilities (pt) do vary over the life of the bond. In particular, and consistent with
previous literature (i.e., Duﬃe and Singleton, 2003), in our data pt increases (decreases) with
the horizon for investment-grade (high yield) bonds. This pattern might be due to mean-
reversion in leverage ratios (Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein, 2001). For example, for BBB
bonds the marginal (yearly) default probability starts at 0.30% two years following issuance,
but goes up to approximately 0.85% at year 10. In contrast, for B-rated bonds the 2-year
marginal probability is approximately 8%, while the 10-year marginal is approximately 3%.
The general formula (4) allows for a term-structure of default probabilities. Nevertheless,
to better illustrate the procedure we start with the simple time-invariant case developed in
section 3.2.
The ﬂat term structure example Assuming that the marginal risk neutral probability
of default and the risk free rate are constant over time, we can use formula (9) to value
ﬁnancial distress. The average risk-free rate in our time period is 6.45%.I fw ea v e r a g et h e
marginal (historical) probabilities of default across years 1 to 17 we obtain the following
values for ratings AAA to B, respectively: (0.11%, 0.13%, 0.23%, 0.67%, 2.43%, 4.85%). We
15assume that the risk neutral marginal probabilities for each rating are equal to the fractions
kj depicted in Table 3, times these historical probabilities.25 For example, for the BBB
rating the risk-neutral marginal probability would be approximately equal to 3.5% if we
use the Chen et al. (or Longstaﬀ et al.)’s numbers, but it would be approximately equal to
1.3% a c c o r d i n gt ot h eH u a n ga n dH u a n gr i s k - a d j u s t m e n t .
In order to translate these risk-neutral probabilities into NPV of distress costs we only
need to add an estimate for φ. The papers discussed in the introduction suggest that the
term φ should be of the order of 10% to 23% of pre-distress ﬁrm value. For a loss of 15%
of value in the event of distress, equation (9) suggests a NPV of ﬁnancial distress of 1.41%
of ﬁrm value for BBB bonds if we use the historical marginal probability of 0.67% (this is
0.67%
0.67%+6.45% ∗ 15%). If we incorporate Huang and Huang’s risk adjustment the NPV goes
up to 2.5% of ﬁrm value, and it goes up to 5.30% of ﬁrm value under the Chen et al.’s risk
adjustment. These numbers suggest that the distress risk adjustment has a ﬁrst order eﬀect
on the valuation of distress. In addition, the cost of distress becomes substantially higher
under the assumption that the yield spread is largely due to default risk, as the Chen et
al.’s numbers suggest. The following analysis will show that these conclusions carry over to
the more general case with time variation in default probabilities and risk free rates.
Empirical Estimates for the General Model We incorporate term structure eﬀects
into the analysis by allowing the historical default probabilities and the risk free rate to
vary with maturity. To compute equation (4), we must ﬁrst calculate a terminal cost of
ﬁnancial distress. For that purpose, we assume th a tt h er i s k - f r e er a t ei sc o n s t a n ta f t e ry e a r
10, and equal to rF
10 (which is 7.08% in our data). In addition, we use the average marginal
probability of default between years 10 and 17 as the long term marginal default probability.
We choose to use an average probability, because individual probabilities are likely to be
estimated with error, and because the valuation is very sensitive to the calculation of the
25Notice that this assumption implies a constant ratio of the marginal probabilities for each rating, which
is slightly diﬀerent than having a constant ratio of the cumulative probabilities, as in Assumption A3. We
make this assumption in this section to illustrate the procedure in a simple way, but we work with assumption
A3 in the general case below (Section 3.3.3).
16terminal value. We thus assume that the marginal probability of default is constant after
year 10, that is, pt = p10−17 for t ≥ 10,w h e r ep10−17 is the average marginal between years
10 and 17, according to the Moodys data.26 Finally, equation (13) allows us to go from
historical to risk neutral probabilities, for each bond rating. As explained above, we use
three diﬀerent approaches to go from historical to risk neutral probabilities (Huang and
Huang (2003), Longstaﬀ et al. (2004), and Chen et al. (2005)).





Bt ˜ Qt−1˜ pt
#




˜ p10−17 + rF
10
.( 1 5 )
Table 4 shows our estimates of the risk-adjusted cost of ﬁnancial distress, for diﬀerent
bond ratings and for each of the three approaches to go from historical to risk-neutral
probabilities. We also show the non-risk-adjusted cost of distress, computed using historical
probabilities. We use a value of φ = 15% throughout. As explained above, the risk-
adjustment is not available for all ratings in all of the approaches.
If we use historical probabilities to value ﬁnancial distress, the cost of distress goes
from approximately 0.25% for AAA/AA bonds to up to 7.70% for B-rated bonds. The
risk-adjustment has a substantial impact in these costs, specially if the ratio between risk
neutral and historical probabilities is large. For example, an increase in leverage that moves
a ﬁrm from an AAA to a BBB rating increases the cost of distress by 1.11% if we use
historical probabilities, by 1.83% if we use Huang and Huang, and by 5.88% if we use the
risk adjustment implicit in the results of Chen et al. (2005). Thus, the marginal eﬀect of a
26Speciﬁcally, we use p10−17 to construct the cumulative probability P10 as 1−Q9(1−p10−17), instead of
using the historical P10.
27Assumption A3 implies that ˜ Qt−1˜ pt = kjQt−1pt.W e u s e t h e kj in Table 3 to go from historical to
risk-neutral probabilities, for each rating and maturity.
28The risk-neutral marginal probability in the terminal value formula is computed from the cumulative
risk neutral probabilities e P9 and e P10, which in their turn are computed from the cumulative probabilities
P9 and P10 using assumption A3.
17decrease in rating on the cost of distress can be quite large. In section 5 we explore these
marginal eﬀects in the context of a static trade-oﬀ m o d e lo fc a p i t a ls t r u c t u r e .
Notice also that the risk adjustments in Chen et al (2005) and Longstaﬀ et al. (2004)
appear to generate similar costs of distress, reﬂecting their conclusion that the fraction of
the yield spread that is due to credit risk is likely to be large. In contrast, the Huang and
Huang estimates are closer to the historical values than to those of the other two approaches.
4 Implementation using Asset Pricing Models
In this section, we show how one can adjust for the systematic risk of ﬁnancial distress by
using standard asset pricing models. While limited in some respects, this approach is useful
for three reasons. First, the approach allows us to provide direct qualitative evidence for the
existence of a systematic component of ﬁnancial distress risk. Second, it allows us to look
at a broader measure of ﬁnancial distress, for which we do not need to assume that distress
states and default states are the same. Third, it provides us with a way of incorporating
recovery risk in the analysis of the previous section, where we assumed that recovery rates
were constant.
We deﬁne εt such that
mt ≡ Bt (1 + εt) .




Bt (E [dj,t]+cov [εt,d j,t]) .










29Here is a sketch of the proof. We assume that ˜ Pj,t = kjPt, and we want to show that Φj = kjΦ
o
j.
Given the valuation formula, it is enough to show that ˜ Qj,t−1˜ pj,t = kjQj,t−1pj,t.T h i si st u r nf o l l o w sf r o m







Equation 18 shows that the risk-adjustment kj is a direct function of the covariance
between the pricing kernel and the distress indicator. In particular, if distress is more likely
to happen in bad times this covariance is positive, implying that kj > 1 and that Φj > Φo
j.
We now use some standard pricing kernels to estimate this covariance.
4.1 Pricing Kernels
To compute the risk adjustment in equation 18, we need to take a stand on the pricing
kernel of the economy. There is no agreement as to what this kernel is, so we will illustrate
our approach with the most commonly used kernels.
4.1.1 Consumption-Based Models
We use aggregate consumption growth to deﬁne the pricing kernel mt. The consumption
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where ct is the sum of the consumption of non-durables and services, in real terms, and γ
is the degree of risk-aversion of the representative agent. Another popular model is based
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where the surplus consumption ratio follows
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The consumption data that is required to compute the pricing kernels described above come
from the NIPA.
194.1.2 Factor Models




= rF + λ0βi , (23)
where λ = E (f) − rF. Our discussion of how to move from a factor representation to






=1 , we can look for a representation of the form
m = E (m) ×
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b = −var(f)−1 ¡
E (f) − rF¢
.( 2 5 )
Given the vector b, we can construct the stochastic process
εt =1+b0 (ft − E (f)).( 2 6 )
We will use the CAPM (with the market return as the only factor) and the 3-factor model
of Fama and French.
4.2 Estimation Strategy
Equation (18) implies that the risk-adjustment depends on the covariance between εt and
dj,t. Because of data limitations, however, we cannot estimate kj for diﬀerent ratings.
Instead we compute an average estimate of cov [εt,d t] using the time-series covariance be-
tween the probability of ﬁnancial distress and the pricing kernel, and we estimate E[dt] as
the average probability of ﬁnancial distress.
In order to compute a time-series for the probability of ﬁnancial distress, we follow two
alternative strategies. Our ﬁrst strategy is to use the annual default rates in the high yield
bond market from Altman, Brady, Resti, and Sironi (2003). These authors compute the
weighted average default rate on bonds in the high yield bond market, where weights are
20based on the face value of all high yield bonds outstanding each year and the size of each
defaulting issue within a particular year. They have data for the period of 1982-2003.
Our second strategy is to relax the assumption that default states and distress states
coincide exactly. For instance, key employees may choose to quit when they anticipate that
the ﬁrm will face severe liquidity problems, which may happen before any actual default, and
even if the ﬁrm manages to avoid default altogether. We follow the previous literature, and
say that a ﬁrm-year is ﬁnancially distressed if the ﬁrm’s operating income (EBITDA) is less
than a certain percentage of its yearly interest expense. Asquith, Gertner and Scharfstein
(1994) use 90% as the percentage cutoﬀ to deﬁne ﬁnancial distress. Andrade and Kaplan
(1998) require that EBITDA be lower than interest expense (corresponding to a 100%
cutoﬀ), but also use other more qualitative criteria to deﬁne an event of distress. To verify
robustness, we use cutoﬀs of 85%, 90%, 95%, 100% and 105%.
We start from the universe of manufacturing ﬁrms (SIC 2000—3999) with data available
in COMPUSTAT on operating income (EBITDA) and interest expenses. We restrict the
sample period to 1982—2003 to allow comparison with the ﬁrst method. For each year t,
our estimate of dt is simply the fraction of ﬁrms that are in distress in this particular year.
Finally, we use the series dt to compute the statistics required in equation (18).30
4.3 Results from the Pricing Models
F i g u r e2s h o w st h et i m es e r i e so fεt for the diﬀerent pricing kernels described above, the de-
fault rate and the 95% accounting measure of distress from COMPUSTAT. Table 5 presents
our estimates of
cov[εt,dt]
E[dt] in equation (18). The covariance of distress probabilities with as-
set pricing kernels is positive for all the models, but the magnitude of the risk-adjustment
varies from 2% to 17%. It is strongest if we use the simple consumption CAPM (column
1), and weakest if we use the factors models together with the COMPUSTAT accounting
30One issue we face is that the sample changes over time, with the entry of young ﬁrms that have very
small or negative proﬁts. We therefore eliminate the ﬁrm-year observations for which operating income is
negative. We then estimate the probability of distress in two ways, ﬁrst using a balanced panel of ﬁrms, and
second using the full panel, but including ﬁrms ﬁxed eﬀects. Both make the dt series stationary and lead to
similar results.
21measure. One possible explanation for this pattern is that the factor models are based on
market data, which tend to move much faster than the accounting data on which we base
our accounting measure of distress. The estimated bias is more consistent across pricing
kernels when we use the default rate on high yield bonds.
These results suggest that the qualitative conclusions derived in section 3 are robust
to this alternative methodology. It gives direct evidence that ﬁnancial distress is indeed
more likely to happen in bad times. However, the size of the risk-adjustment suggested
in this section is substantially smaller than the one suggested by the previous method.31
The ratios of 1.02 to 1.17 between risk-neutral and historical probabilities that we obtain
in this section look small when compared to the ratios reported in Table 3. It is not very
surprising, however, that we obtain smaller risk adjustments, since it is well known that
standard asset pricing kernels have a hard time explaining the entire risk premium that
is observed in asset prices. By contrast, the procedure in section 3 does not require the
speciﬁcation of the pricing kernel. Thus, we see the results in this section as a conservative
lower bound for the distress risk adjustment.
4.4 Recovery Risk
One payoﬀ of the approach in this section is that is provides us with a way to relax our
previous assumption of constant recovery (assumption A2). In the general case of random
recovery, formula (5) of the previous section becomes
Vt =[ ˜ ρ(1 − e Qt)+ e Qt]Bt , (27)
where




31Given these estimates for k, it is straightforward to repeat the valuation exercises that we performed
in section 3.3.3. In particular, one can directly use equations 14 and 15, which allow for a term-structure
of default probabilities and interest rates. As suggested by Proposition 1, the risk neutral probabilities
would be estimated as b k times the historical probabilities, for all bond ratings. Given the small size of the
adjustment, the resulting NPVs of ﬁnancial distress are very close to the historical ones in Table 4, and so
w ed on o tr e p o r tt h e mh e r e .
22is the risk neutral recovery rate. We can use the pricing kernels described above to estimate
˜ ρ by correlating the kernels with our annual data on recovery rates from Moodys, for the
period 1982-2001.
We ﬁnd that the risk neutral adjustment is relatively small, compared to the benchmark
recovery rate of 41%. The CAPM and the Campbell-Cochrane kernels both predict a risk
neutral recovery rate of 38%. The Fama-French kernel suggests 40%, and the Consumption
CAPM suggests 37%. Even making the correlation between the kernel and the recovery
rate equal to minus one (−1), the risk-adjusted recovery rate does not drop below 31%.I f
we rerun the analysis of section 3.3.3 by replacing the average recovery rate of 41% with
this extreme value (31%), we obtain costs of distress that are lower than those reported
in Table 4, but not by much. For example, the cost of distress for BBB bonds using the
Chen et al. or the Longstaﬀ et al. risk adjustments becomes approximately 5.4%,i n s t e a d
of 6.1% as in Table 4. We conclude that recovery risk is unlikely to have a major eﬀect on
our previous estimates of the risk-adjusted cost of ﬁnancial distress.
5 Implications for Capital Structure
Our results show that the costs of ﬁnancial distress can become much larger once we adjust
for risk. We now explore what this implies for the capital structure decision, in the context
of a static trade-oﬀ model. Existing literature suggests that distress costs are too small
to overcome the potential tax beneﬁts of increased leverage, and thus corporations may be
using debt too conservatively (Graham, 2000). In this section, we attempt to verify whether
this conclusion continues to hold if we use our valuation formulas to calculate marginal costs
of ﬁnancial distress.
Naturally, these calculations are subject to the limitations of the static trade-oﬀ model.
Our point is not to argue that this model is the correct one, nor to provide a full characteri-
zation of ﬁrms’ optimal ﬁnancial policies. We simply want to verify whether the magnitude
of the costs of ﬁnancial distress that we calculate is comparable to that of tax beneﬁts of
debt. We believe this is a worthy exercise, given the common belief that ﬁnancial distress
23costs seem to be too small to matter for capital structure.32
5.1 The risk adjustment in the static trade-oﬀ model
We start by showing with a simple static trade-oﬀ model that the presence of a distress
risk adjustment implies a lower optimal leverage ratio for the ﬁrm. According to the static
trade-oﬀ model, the ﬁrm should maximize:
V = V 0 + NPV(tax beneﬁts of debt) − V 0Φ . (29)
where V 0 is the ﬁrm’s unlevered value, and Φ is the NPV of ﬁnancial distress. In this
section, we assume for simplicity that the risk adjustment k is the same across ratings,
˜ p = kp, (30)
and also that the probability of default is constant over time, so we can use equation (9) to
value distress costs.
In order to calculate the NPV of tax beneﬁts of debt, we assume perpetual debt and
write the tax beneﬁtc a s hﬂow as τx,w h e r ex is the coupon that is promised to bondholders
every period. However, we note that the tax beneﬁts only accrue to the ﬁrm in the event
of no default. We can thus build a valuation tree for tax beneﬁts that is similar to that in
Figure 1. Each period, there is a probability ˜ p that the tax beneﬁts are equal to zero. This
set up implies that, assuming time invariance, the tax beneﬁts of debt should be given by:
NPV(tax beneﬁts of debt) ≡ T =
1 − ˜ p
˜ p + rF τx.( 3 1 )
We can show that if bond recovery is equal to zero (ρ =0 ), this formula collapses to
the standard, textbook τD formula, where D is the market value of debt.33 Thus, one
32Besides Graham (2000), Andrade and Kaplan (1998) also suggest that the NPV of ﬁnancial distress
might be too small to matter:
“[..] from an ex-ante perspective that trades oﬀ expected costs of ﬁnancial distress against
the tax and incentive beneﬁts of debt, the costs of ﬁnancial distress seem low [..]. If the costs
are 10 percent, then the expected costs of distress [..] are modest because the probability of
ﬁnancial distress is very small for most public companies.” (Andrade and Kaplan, p. 1488-
1489).
33This result follows from the fact that with zero recovery the cash ﬂows from tax beneﬁts are exactly a
fraction τ of the cash ﬂows to bondholders in all states, and thus by arbitrage the value of tax beneﬁts must
be equal to τD.
24should think of equation (31) as the standard textbook formula adjusted for the fact that
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where the risk neutral probability of distress e p is equal to kp, and the true probability of
distress p increases with x. We assume for simplicity that the actual probability of default p
is linear in the leverage ratio x
V 0,t h a ti s :p = a x
V 0 with a>0. Under those assumptions, it







The comparative statics are intuitive. The optimal amount of leverage increases with the
corporate income tax rate and decreases with the deadweight loss in distress. In addition,
an increase in the risk-adjustment k reduces the optimal amount of leverage.
A less obvious question is whether the quantitative eﬀect of distress risk on optimal
leverage can be large. We now turn to this question.
5.2 Estimating the eﬀect of distress risk on capital structure choices
In section 3, we estimate the costs of ﬁnancial distress for each bond rating. In order to
compare these costs with tax beneﬁts of debt, we need to estimate the typical tax beneﬁts
that the average ﬁrm can expect at each bond rating. To do this, we follow closely the
analysis in Graham (2000), who estimates the marginal tax beneﬁts of debt, and Molina
(2005), who relates leverage ratios to bond ratings.
5.2.1 The marginal tax beneﬁto fd e b t
Graham (2000) estimates the marginal tax beneﬁt of debt as a function of the amount
of interest deducted, and calculates total tax beneﬁts of debt by integrating under this
function. The marginal tax beneﬁt is constant up to a certain amount of leverage, and
then it starts declining because ﬁrms do not pay taxes in all states of nature, and because
25higher leverage decreases additional marginal beneﬁts (as there is less income to shield).
Essentially, we can think of the tax beneﬁts of debt in Graham (2000) as being equal to
τ∗D (where τ∗ takes into account both personal and corporate taxes) for leverage ratios
that are low enough such that the ﬁrm has not reached the point at which marginal beneﬁts
start decreasing (see footnote 13 in Graham’s paper). If leverage is higher than this, then
marginal beneﬁts start decreasing. Graham calls this point the kink in the ﬁrm’s tax beneﬁt
function. Formally, the kink is deﬁned as:
kink =
amount of interest that causes marginal beneﬁt to start decreasing
actual interest expense
,( 3 4 )
so that a ﬁrm with a kink of 2 can double its interest deductions, and still keep a constant
marginal beneﬁt of debt. Firms with high kinks use leverage more conservatively.
Graham calculates the amount of tax beneﬁts that the average ﬁrm in his sample fore-
goes. The average ﬁrm in COMPUSTAT (in the time period 1980-1994) has a kink of 2.356,
and a leverage ratio of approximately 0.34. Graham also estimates that the average ﬁrm
could have gained 7.3% of their market value if it levers up to its kink. In addition, notice
that the ﬁrm remains in the ﬂat portion of the marginal beneﬁt curve until its kink reaches
one. Thus, these numbers allow us to compute the marginal beneﬁto fi n c r e a s i n gd e b ti n
the ﬂat portion of the curve (τ∗) implied in Graham’s data. If we assume that the typical
ﬁrm needs to increase leverage by 2.356 times to move to a kink equal to one, we can back
out the value of τ∗ as 0.157. Because we can use the formula τ∗D in the ﬂat portion of the
curve, we can calculate tax beneﬁts for each leverage ratio, assuming that kink is higher
than one. Clearly, this approximation is no longer reasonable if leverage becomes too high.
We use this approximation in the calculations below. To the extent that the approximation
is not true for high leverage ratios, we are probably overestimating tax beneﬁts of debt for
these leverage values.
In order to remain closer to Graham’s estimates, our calculations will also ignore the
non-zero recovery adjustment for tax beneﬁts, which we derived in the previous section. If
we do incorporate this adjustment, the tax beneﬁts of debt become slightly lower, but not
26by much.34
5.2.2 The relation between leverage and bond ratings
To compute the tax beneﬁts of debt at each bond rating, we need to assign a typical leverage
ratio for each bond rating. A simple way of doing this is to collect average or median leverage
ratios for each bond rating from COMPUSTAT. However, as discussed by Molina (2005),
the relationship between leverage and ratings is aﬀected by the endogeneity of the leverage
decision. In particular, because less risky and more proﬁtable ﬁrms can have higher leverage
without increasing much the probability of ﬁnancial distress, the impact of leverage on bond
ratings might appear to be too small if we ignore this endogeneity problem.
The leverage data that we use is summarized in Table 6. Column I reports Molina’s
predicted leverage values for each bond rating, from his Table VI. This table associates
leverage ratios to each rating, using Molina’s regression model in Table V, and values of the
control variables that are set equal to those of the average ﬁrm with a kink of approximately
two in Graham’s (2000) sample. According to Molina, these values give an estimate of the
impact of leverage on ratings for the average ﬁrm in Graham’s sample. In order to verify
the robustness of our results, we also use the simple descriptive statistics in Molina’s (2005)
Table IV (column II of Table 6). He reports the ratio of long term debt to book assets, for
each rating in the period 1998-2002. As discussed by Molina, despite the aforementioned
endogeneity problem the rating changes in these summary statistics actually resemble those
predicted by the model. We have also collected average (book) leverage ratios at each
rating for manufacturing ﬁrms in a broader time period (1981-2004). The relation between
leverage and ratings in this broader period is similar to that in Molina (see column III),
with slightly lower leverage ratios at each rating.
5.2.3 Capital structure results
Table 7 depicts our estimates of the tax beneﬁts of debt for each bond rating. It also reports
the diﬀerence between the present value of tax beneﬁts and the cost of distress calculated
34Results available from the authors upon request.
27under diﬀerent hypothesis about the risk-adjustment. The present value of tax beneﬁts is
calculated as 0.157 times the leverage ratio for each rating (see section 5.2.1). In column
1 we report the present value of the tax beneﬁts of debt associated with each bond rating,
and in the four subsequent columns we report the diﬀerence between tax beneﬁts and the
cost of distress, for the model with no risk-adjustment, and for the three diﬀerent ways in
which we calculated the risk-adjustment in section 3.35 We use a loss in value given distress
of 15% in Table 7.
Panel A reports the results using the leverage ratios from Molina’s (2005) regression
model (column 1, Table 6). The diﬀerence between tax beneﬁts and the non risk-adjusted
cost of distress (column 2) suggests that the average ﬁrm should beneﬁt from increasing
leverage at least until it reaches a bond rating of A to BBB. The marginal increase in value
that comes from tax beneﬁts is clearly higher than the increase in distress costs until this
leverage range. However, further increases in leverage beyond a rating of BBB appear to
decrease ﬁrm value because the marginal increase in distress costs is higher than the gain
in tax beneﬁts. Column 3 shows that incorporating the Huang and Huang risk adjustment
does not substantially change these conclusions, in that the diﬀerence between tax beneﬁts
and distress costs still increases until the ﬁrm reaches a rating of A to BBB.36
Nevertheless, Columns 4 and 5 tell a very diﬀerent story. If we incorporate the higher
risk-adjustments impliedb yt h er e s u l t si nL o n g s t a ﬀ et al. (2004) and Chen et al. (2005),
then it is no longer clear that a ﬁrm would gain much from increasing leverage, even if
its current rating is as high as AAA or AA. For example, if we use Longstaﬀ et al.’s risk
adjustment (Column 4), the ﬁrm does not appear to gain much by increasing leverage from
A At oA .T h ei n c r e a s ei nt a xb e n e ﬁts is substantial (2% of ﬁrm value), but the increase
in distress costs is of the same magnitude (see also Table 4). The Chen et al. results
(Column 5) only allow us to report costs of distress for two ratings (AAA and BBB), but
35We do not use the risk-adjustment based on the asset pricing model, because, as we will see, the
conclusions about capital structure are the same as those that are based on the Huang and Huang (2003)
risk adjustment.
36Because the risk-adjustment implied by the asset pricing models are even smaller than that of Huang
and Huang, these conclusions would have been the same under that alternative adjustment.
28the limited evidence is consistent with that in Longstaﬀ et al., given that the diﬀerence
between tax beneﬁts and costs of distress is clearly higher for the AAA rating. The ﬁrm
gains approximately 5% its value in tax beneﬁts by moving from AAA to BBB, but according
to the Chen et al. estimates the associated increase in distress costs is close to 6% of ﬁrm
value.
Despite the diﬀerence in leverage ratios, Panel B suggests a similar conclusion. If the
cost of ﬁnancial distress is not risk-adjusted, or if it is adjusted according to Huang and
Huang (2003), the optimal bond rating for an average ﬁrm should be as high as A, or BBB.
However, if we incorporate the risk-adjustments implied by Longstaﬀ et al. (2004) or Chen
et al. (2005), there is no evidence that the ﬁrm gains much by increasing leverage from any
level, including AAA or AA.
Figure 3 gives a visual picture of our main capital structure implication. In it, we plot
the diﬀerences between tax beneﬁts and costs of distress using the Molina et al.’s (2005)
leverage numbers (column I, Table 6). We do not plot the numbers based on the Chen et al.
risk adjustment, since there are only two points. Clearly, while the distress costs with no
risk adjustment or with the risk adjustment based on Huang and Huang generate a U-shape
for the net beneﬁts of debt that peaks at about the A to BBB rating, the risk-adjustment
b a s e do nL o n g s t a ﬀ et al. actually suggests that the optimal bond rating could be AA or
higher.
These estimates assume a loss in value given default of 15%. However, we obtain similar
results for any value ranging from 10% to 20%, which is roughly the range estimated by
Andrade and Kaplan (1998). In order to see this, consider Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 reports
the diﬀerences between tax beneﬁts and distress costs using Molina et al.’s (2005) leverage
and assuming no risk-adjustment, for diﬀerent values of the loss given distress. For all
values of φ, the diﬀerence between tax beneﬁts and distress costs increases until the ﬁrm
reaches a rating of A/BBB, and then starts decreasing (or stays constant, if φ = 10%). In
contrast, if we repeat this exercise with distress costs that are risk-adjusted according to
Longstaﬀ et al. (2004), then the diﬀerence is (roughly) ﬂat or decreasing, suggesting that
29the ﬁrm might not lose much value by retaining a rating of AA or higher.
Interpretation and comparison with previous literature Table 7 and Figures 3 to
5 show that risk-adjusted costs of ﬁnancial distress can counteract the marginal tax beneﬁts
of debt estimated by Graham (2000). This conclusion is specially true if the fraction of the
yield spread that is due to default risk is large, as suggested by Longstaﬀ et al. (2004) and
Chen et al. (2005). In this case, our results show that the marginal gains in tax beneﬁts
of moving from the highest ratings such as AAA or AA can be lower than the associated
increase in distress costs. If the fraction of the spread that is due to default is lower (as
suggested by Huang and Huang (2003)), then the average ﬁrm should lever up to the point
at which its rating is A or BBB, but not beyond that.
These results suggest that ﬁnancial distress costs can help explain why ﬁrms use debt
conservatively, as suggested by Graham (2000). We note, however, that Graham’s evidence
for debt conservatism is not based only on the observation that the average ﬁrm appears
to use too little debt. It is also the case in his data that ﬁrms that appear to have low
costs of ﬁnancial distress have lower leverage (higher kinks). Our results do not address
this cross-sectional aspect of debt conservatism.
Molina (2005) argues that the bigger impact of leverage on bond ratings and probabilities
of distress that he ﬁnds after correcting for the endogeneity of the leverage decision can also
help explain why ﬁrms use debt conservatively. However, Molina does not perform a full-
ﬂedged valuation of ﬁnancial distress costs like we do in this paper. His calculations are
based on the same approximation of marginal costs of ﬁnancial distress used by Graham
(2000), which is to write Φ = pφ,w h e r ep is the 10-year cumulative historical default rate.
This formula ignores discounting, risk-adjustment and term structure eﬀects. Table 7 and
Figure 3 show that the risk-adjustment has a ﬁrst order eﬀect on the marginal costs of
distress, and thus on the capital structure predictions of the static trade-oﬀ model. In
contrast, in our calibration, using simple summary statistics or using Molina’s regression
results to relate leverage to bond ratings does not seem to aﬀect much the capital structure
30predictions of the trade-oﬀ model.37
6F i n a l R e m a r k s
We develop a methodology to estimate the present value of ﬁnancial distress costs, which
takes into account the systematic component in the risk of distress. Given the simplicity
of our formulas and their easy implementation, we believe that they will be useful for
practitioners and academics alike, for research and teaching purposes. In addition, our
results show that the traditional practice of assuming risk-neutrality to value distress costs
can result in severe underestimation of the total costs, specially if the fraction of the yield
spread that is due to default risk is large. The large marginal distress costs that we ﬁnd can
help explain the apparent reluctance of ﬁrms to increase their leverage, despite the existence
of positive marginal tax-beneﬁts of debt. While large costs of ﬁnancial distress are probably
not the only reason why ﬁrms appear to be debt conservative, our results suggest that they
can be part of the story.
The large risk-adjusted NPVs of distress that we ﬁnd in some of our calculations are a
direct consequence of the bond premium puzzle, namely the fact that bond yields spreads
are too large to be explained by historical default rates. Thus, the fact that investors seem to
require large risk premia to hold corporate bonds might justify ﬁrms’ aversion to leverage, if
the ﬁrm’s goal is to maximize the wealth of these risk-averse investors. In other words, bond
spreads and capital structure decisions appear to be consistent with each other. Recently,
Cremers, Driessen, Maenhout and Weinbaum (2005) have shown that implied volatilities
and jump risks, measured in option prices, can explain credit spreads across ﬁrms and over
time. In other words, corporate bonds spreads and option prices are also consistent with
each other. Taken together, these results suggest that risk aversion in ﬁnancial markets may
be high, but that it is not arbitrary. Market participants, from options and bonds traders
37In addition, there are two diﬀerences between our calculations and those performed by Molina. First,
his marginal tax beneﬁt so fd e b ta r es m a l l e rt h a nt h eo n e sw eu s e ,b e c a u s eh eu s e sm o r er e c e n td a t af r o m
Graham that implies a t
∗ of around 13%. Second, when comparing marginal tax beneﬁts with marginal
c o s t so fd i s t r e s s( T a b l eV I I )h eu s e st h eminimum change in leverage that induces a rating downgrade. In
contrast, we use the average leverage values for each rating in Table 7.
31to corporate managers, seem to respond similarly to the price of risk.
32References
Acharya, V., S. Bharath and A. Srinivasan, 2004, Understanding the Recovery Rates of
Defaulted Securities. Working paper, London Business School and University of Michigan.
Allen, L. and T. Saunders, 2004, Incorporating Systemic Inﬂuences Into Risk Measure-
ments: A Survey of the Literature, forthcoming, Journal of Financial Services Research.
Altman, E., 1984, A Further Empirical Investigation of the Bankruptcy Cost Question,
Journal of Finance 39, 1067-1089.
Altman, E., B. Brady, A. Resti, A Sironi, 2003, The Link between Default and Recovery
Rates: Theory, Empirical Evidence and Implications. Working paper, New York University.
Andrade, G. and S. Kaplan, 1998, How Costly is Financial (not Economic) Distress?
Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions that Become Distressed. Journal of Finance
53, 1443-1493.
Asquith, P., R. Gertner and D. Scharfstein, 1994, Anatomy of Financial Distress: An
Examination of Junk Bond Issuers. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109, 625-658.
Campbell, J. and Cochrane J., 1999, By Force of Habit: A Consumption-Based Expla-
nation of Aggregate Stock Market Behavior. Journal of Political Economy 107, 205-251
Chen, L., D. Lesmond, and J. Wei, 2004, Corporate Yield Spreads and Bond Liquidity.
Working paper, Michigan State University and Tulane University.
Chen, L., Collin-Dufresne, P and R. Goldstein, 2005, On the Relation Between Credit
Spread Puzzles and the Equity Premium Puzzle. Working paper, Michigan State University,
U.C. Berkeley and University of Minnesota.
Cochrane, John H., 2001 “Asset Pricing." Princeton University Press.
Collin-Dufresne, P. and R. Goldstein, 2001, Do Credit Spreads Reﬂect Stationary Lever-
age Ratios? Journal of Finance 56, 1929-1957.
Collin-Dufresne, P., R. Goldstein and P. Martin, 2001, The Determinants of Credit
Spread Changes. Journal of Finance 56, 2177-2208.
Cremers, M., J. Driessen, P. Maenhout, and D. Weinbaum, 2005, Individual Stock-
Option Prices and Credit Spreads. Working paper, Yale University, University of Amster-
33dam, INSEAD and Cornell University.
Denis, D. and D. Denis, 1995, Causes of Financial Distress Following Leveraged Recap-
italizations. Journal of Financial Economics 37, 129-157.
Driessen, J., 2005, Is Default Event Risk Priced in Corporate Bonds?, Review of Finan-
cial Studies 18, 165-195.
Duﬃe, D. and K. Singleton, 2003, Credit Risk: Pricing, Measurement, and Management,
Princeton University Press.
Eberhardt, A., E. Altman and R. Aggarwal, 1999, The equity performance of ﬁrms
emerging from bankruptcy. Journal of Finance 54, 1855-1868.
Elton, E., M. Gruber, D. Agrawal and C. Mann, 2001, Explaining the Rate Spread on
Corporate Bonds. Journal of Finance 56, p.247-278.
Fama E. and French K., 1993, Common Risk Factors in the Returns on Stocks and
Bonds. Journal of Financial Economics 25, 3-56.
Gilson, S., 1997, Transaction Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Fi-
nancially Distressed Firms. Journal of Finance 52, 161-196.
Graham, J., 2000, How Big are the Tax Beneﬁts of Debt? Journal of Finance 55,
1901-1942.
Hennessy, C., and T. Whited, 2005, Debt dynamics. Journal of Finance 60, 1129-1165.
Huang, J. Z. and M. Huang, 2003, How Much of the Corporate-Treasury Yield Spread
is Due to Credit Risk?, working paper, Penn State University and Stanford University.
Jones, E., S. Mason and E. Rosenfeld, 1984, Contingent Claim Analysis of Corporate
Capital Structures: An Empirical Analysis. Journal of Finance 39, 611-625.
Lando, D., 2004, Credit Risk Modeling, Princeton University Press.
Longstaﬀ, F., E. Neis and S. Mittal, 2004, Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or
Liquidity? New Evidence from the Credit-Default Swap Market. forthcoming, Journal of
Finance.
Molina, C., 2005, Are Firms Underleveraged? An Examination of the Eﬀect of Leverage
on Default Probabilities, Journal of Finance 60, 1427-1459.
34Myers, S., 1977, “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing,” Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 5, 147-175.
Ofek, E., 1993, Capital Structure and Firm Response to Poor Performance. Journal of
Financial Economics 37, 3-30.
Opler, T. and S. Titman, 1994, Financial Distress and Corporate Performance. Journal
of Finance 49, 1015-1040.
Sharpe, S., 1994, Financial Market Imperfections, Firm Leverage and the Cyclicality of
Employment. American Economic Review 84, 1060-1074.
Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, 1992, Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market
Equilibrium Approach. Journal of Finance 47, 1343-1365.
Titman, S. , and S. Tsyplakov, 2004, A Dynamic Model of Optimal Capital Structure.
W o r k i n gp a p e r ,U n i v e r s i t yo fT e x a s ,A u s t i n .
Warner, J., 1977, Bankruptcy Costs: Some Evidence. Journal of Finance 32, 337-347.
Weiss, L., 1990, Bankruptcy Resolution. Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of
Claims. Journal of Financial Economics 27, 255-311.
Wruck, K., 1990, Financial Distress, Reorganization, and Organizational Eﬃciency.
Journal of Financial Economics 27, 419-444.
35 
Table 1. Yield Spreads and Cumulative Default Probabilities 
 
  Yield spreads  Cumulative default probabilities
Credit Rating  4-year  10-year 4-year  10-year 
AAA 0.55%  0.63%  0.04%  0.80% 
AA 0.65%  0.91%  0.20%  0.96% 
A 1.06%  1.21%  0.35%  1.63% 
BBB 1.69%  1.78%  1.44%  5.22% 
BB 3.08%  3.08%  8.83%  21.48% 
B 5.08%  5.08%  26.01%  46.52% 
CCC 9.78%  9.78%  51.85%  77.79%   
          
 
The spread data for A, BBB, BB, B and CCC bonds come from Citigroup’s 
yieldbook, which reports average spreads for the period 1985-2004. Data for AAA 
and AA bonds comes from Huang and Huang (2003), and refer to the averages 
over the period 1973-1993. The cumulative default probabilities are from the 
Moody’s dataset, averages over the period 1970-2001. 
 
  
Table 2. Fraction of the Yield Spread Due to Default 
 
  Huang and Huang 
(2003) 
Longstaff et al. 
(2004) 
Chen et al. 
(2005) 
Credit Rating  4-year  10-year  5-year spread  4-year spread
AAA 0.030  0.208  NA  0 
AA 0.121  0.200  0.51  NA 
A 0.134  0.234  0.56  NA 
BBB 0.245  0.336  0.71  0.67 
BB 0.581  0.633  0.83  NA 
B 0.976  0.833  NA  NA 
        
 
This Table reports the fractions due to default of the yield spread calculated over 
benchmark treasury bonds, for each credit rating and different maturities. The first 
two columns use Huang and Huang (2003)’s results from Table 7, which reports 
calibration results from their model under the assumption that market asset risk 
premia are counter-cyclically time varying. The third column uses Longstaff et al.’s 
(2004) Table IV, which reports model-based ratios of the default component to total 
corporate spread. The fourth column uses results from Chen et al. (2005), who 
suggests that none of the AAA spread is due to default, but the entire BBB minus 
AAA spread can be attributed to default. Thus, the fraction reported for BBB bonds 
is the ratio of the BBB minus AAA spread over the BBB minus treasury spread. NA 
= not available. 
 Table 3. Risk Neutral Cumulative Probabilities of Default, and 
Ratios Between Risk Neutral and Historical Probabilities  
 
  Huang and Huang (2003)  Longstaff et al. 
(2004) 
Chen et al. (2005)
  4-year horizon  10-year horizon  5-year horizon  4-year horizon 
Rating Prob. Ratio    Prob. Ratio Prob. Ratio Prob.  Ratio 
AAA  0.11% 2.81 2.22% 2.79  NA  NA  0.04%  1.00 
AA  0.53% 2.67 3.07% 3.20 2.56% 8.27  NA  NA 
A  0.97% 2.77 4.74% 2.91 5.30%  10.38  NA  NA 
BBB  2.80% 1.94 9.84% 1.89  10.30%  5.28 7.58%  5.26 
BB  11.65% 1.32 29.88% 1.39 20.17% 1.77  NA  NA 
B  29.97% 1.15 57.95% 1.25  NA  NA  NA  NA 
           
 
This Table reports cumulative risk-neutral probabilities of default calculated from bond yield 
spreads, according to the fractions due to default reported in Table 2. The Table also reports 
the ratio between the risk-neutral probabilities and the historical ones, using the historical 
probabilities reported in Table 1. NA = not available. 
 
 
 Table 4. Risk-Adjusted Costs of Financial Distress, as a 
Percentage of Firm Value 
 




Chen et al. 
(2005) 
AAA 0.24%  0.65%  NA  0.24% 
AA 0.27% 0.78% 2.10%  NA 
A  0.48% 1.32% 4.27%  NA 
BBB  1.34% 2.48% 6.14%  6.12% 
BB 4.30% 5.75% 7.38%  NA 
B 7.70%  9.38% NA  NA 
      
  
This Table reports our estimates of the NPV of the costs of financial distress 
expressed as a percentage of firm value, calculated using historical probabilities 
(first column), and risk-adjusted probabilities (remaining columns). The magnitudes 
of the risk-adjustments in the second to fourth columns are as given in Table 3, and 
the historical probabilities are as given in Table 1. We use an estimate for the loss in 









85 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.05
90 0.17 0.16 0.04 0.04
95 0.17 0.17 0.04 0.04
100 0.17 0.16 0.04 0.03
105 0.17 0.16 0.04 0.02
0.17 0.15 0.12 0.10
Table 5: Risk Adjustment Implied by Asset Pricing Models
This Table reports estimates for the covariance between the the probability of distress and 
several asset pricing kernels, normalized by the average probability of financial distress. 
The sample period is 1981-2003. Compustat data includes only manufacturing firms 
(NAICS=3) continuously present in the sample. The first distress measure is the fraction of 
firms whose interest payments exceed x% of their income, with x ranging from 85 to 105. 
The second distress measure is the default rate on the high yield bond market from Altman, 


































Table 6. Typical Book Leverage Ratios for Each Bond Rating 
 







AAA 0.03  0.09  0.09 
AA 0.16 0.17  0.13 
A 0.28  0.22 0.16 
BBB 0.33  0.28  0.21 
BB 0.46 0.34  0.27 
B 0.57  0.42 0.36 
      
  
This Table reports typical book leverage ratios calculated for separate bond ratings. 
The first two columns are drawn from Molina (2005). The first column shows 
predicted leverage ratios from Molina’s Table VI. These values are calculated using 
Molina's regression model (Table V), with values of the control variables set equal to 
those of the average firm with a kink of approximately two in Graham's (2000) 
sample. Column II replicates the simple summary statistics in Molina’s Table IV. 
Column III reports average leverage ratios at each rating for manufacturing firms in 
the period 1981-2004, from COMPUSTAT. 
 Table 7. Tax Benefits of Debt Against Costs of Financial 
Distress  
 
Panel A: Leverage Ratios from Molina’s (2005) regression 
model 
 












AAA 0.47% 0.23% -0.18%  NA  0.23% 
AA 2.51%  2.24%  1.73% 0.41%  NA 
A 4.40%  3.91%  3.08%  0.13%  NA 
BBB 5.18% 3.84%  2.70%  -0.96%  -0.94% 
BB 7.22%  2.92%  1.47%  -0.16%  NA 
B 8.95%  1.25%  -0.43%  NA  NA 
          
 
This Table reports tax benefits of debt and the difference between tax benefits of 
debt and costs of financial distress computed using different assumptions about the 
distress risk-adjustment. The relation between ratings and leverage is estimated 
using Molina’s (2005) regression model. This relation is reported in our paper in 
column I of Table 6. The first column depicts tax benefits of debt calculated for each 
leverage ratio as explained in the text. The remaining columns show the difference 
between tax benefits and distress costs. In the second column we use historical 
default probabilities to estimate distress costs. In the third column we use Huang 
and Huang’s (2003) risk adjustment. In the fourth column we use Longstaff et al. 
(2004) risk adjustment, and in the last column we use Chen et al. (2005). 
 
 Table 7 (cont.) Tax Benefits of Debt Against Costs of 
Financial Distress 
 
Panel B: Leverage Ratios from Molina’s (2005) summary 
statistics 
 












AAA 1.41% 1.18%  0.76%  NA  1.18% 
AA 2.67%  2.40%  1.89% 0.57%  NA 
A 3.45%  2.97%  2.13%  -0.82%  NA 
BBB 4.40% 3.05%  1.91%  -1.75%  -1.72% 
BB 5.34%  1.04%  -0.41%  -2.05%  NA 
B 6.59%  -1.11%  -2.79%  NA  NA 
          
 
This Table reports tax benefits of debt and the difference between tax benefits of 
debt and costs of financial distress computed using different assumptions about the 
distress risk-adjustment. The relation between ratings and leverage is estimated 
using Molina’s (2005) summary statistics. This relation is as reported in our paper in 
column II of Table 6. The first column depicts tax benefits of debt calculated for each 
leverage ratio as explained in the text. The remaining columns show the difference 
between tax benefits and distress costs. In the second column we use historical 
default probabilities to estimate distress costs. In the third column we use Huang 
and Huang’s (2003) risk adjustment. In the fourth column we use Longstaff et al. 
(2004) risk adjustment, and in the last column we use Chen et al. (2005). 








Prob. default in year 3 = 
(1 - p1)*(1 - p2)*p3
φ
φ
…Figure 2. Pricing Kernels and Probability of Distress
Note: As in the text, for each kernel m, we define e by m=E[m]*(1+e). Thus e can be negative, but is always strictly more than -1. The 
figure shows e for the 4 different kernels. CCAPM is consumption CAPM with constant relative risk aversion of 40. Habit is Campbell-
Cochrane model. CAPM is one factor (market) model. Fama-French is 3 factors model (market, size, Tobin's Q). Distress is probability 
that interest payments are more than 95% of operating income from COMPUSTAT. Default is default rate on high yield bonds, from 
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